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 Abstract 
The significant price-trading volume correlation found in the 
residential property market presents a challenge to the rational 
expectation hypothesis. Existing theories account for this fact with either 
capital market imperfection (down-payment effect or loss-aversion 
consideration) or imperfect information (search theoretic models). This 
paper employs data from both the sale and the rental commercial real 
estate market, which face different degrees of severity of capital market 
constraint and thus provide an indirect but effective test for alternative 
theories. Policy implications are also discussed. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
Should the trading volume of an asset and the corresponding price 
be correlated if the agents are rational? In the context of financial market, 
Lucas (1978) demonstrates that there should not be any correlation if the 
agents are rational, the capital market is perfect and if the market is 
centralized. However, accumulating evidence suggests that the opposite is 
true in both equity and property market. On top of the information 
diffusion issue emphasized by the finance literature, the distinctive 
features of the property market such as down-payment requirement (e.g. 
Stein, 1995), loss-version consideration (e.g. Genesove and Mayer, 2001) 
and informational friction (e.g. Berkovec and Goodman, 1996) would 
generate a positive correlation as well.
1  
While consistent evidences in the property market are exclusively 
pertaining to the residential sector, commercial properties 
 (or  office) 
may behave differently. For instance, some of the office buyers have 
greater financing capacity than ordinary households, as large firms can 
raise fund through not only bank loans but also debt and equity issues. 
Large corporations face lower risk of real estate investment since they 
                                                        
1  The literature on asset price and trading volume is too large to be reviewed here. See Follain and Velz 
(1995), Hort (1999), Lamont and Stein (1999), Lo and Wang (2000), Leung, Lau and Leong (2002) for 
more discussion. For models with down-payment effect, see also Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), 
Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1998, 1999), Chen (2001). The loss-version effect is obviously due to the fact 
that there is no insurance market for real estate investment. Thus, loss-aversion theory can also be 
interpreted as a form of imperfect capital market theory. For models with informational friction, see 
also Wheaton (1990), Anglin (1997, 1999), Fisher et. al. (2003). 
 have limited liability. Hence, at least some of the buyers of commercial 
properties face less stringent liquidity constraints and are less risk-averse. 
The capital market imperfection effect is less applicable. In fact, the 
down-payment effect is absent for the rental properties.
2  
To summarize, although there are convincing theories, which 
predict that price and trading volume are positively correlated in the 
residential property market and the “perfect rational expectation model” 
does not hold, whether the well-documented correlation is present in the 
commercial property market will depend on the dominant effect behind. 
Specifically, if the capital market imperfection is the dominant factor of 
the price-trading volume correlation observed in the residential property 
market, then such correlation will be weakened in the sale office market, 
and even weaker in the rental office market.
3  
                                                        
2 Hong Kong Monetary Authority has conducted the monthly survey for residential mortgage loan 
continuously for several years, but unfortunately, no statistics on commercial mortgage loan are 
available so far. On the other hand, few evidences ever suggest any difference in terms of severity of 
informational friction between the commercial property market and the residential property market, or 
between the sale and rental sectors. Intuitively, the information imperfection effect is expected to be as 
relevant to the commercial property market as the residential property market, and the same relevant to 
both the sale and the rental sectors. See Feng (2003) for more details. 
    In Hong Kong, there is a substantial amount of “office space transaction’’ take place in the rental 
market rather than the sale market, and hence provide a lot of information for analysis. The trading 
records of the rental market of office (or commercial property) are much better than the residential 
counterpart. It is because the records of residential sale market and rental markets are kept in two 
different governmental departments until recently. Due to some legal restrictions, it is difficult for 
researchers to match the two kinds of files. 
3  Among others, Fisher et al (2003) is closely related to this paper. They present a nice conceptual 
framework and an econometric model, and find that after controlling for the market-liquidity, the 
housing price and the trading volume are positively correlated. It should be noticed that, however, 
the theoretical model of Fisher et al (2003) is partial equilibrium, while Berkovec and Goodman 
(1996), Wheaton (1990), etc. are general equilibrium in nature. It is not surprising because while 
the focus of Berkovec and Goodman (1996), Wheaton (1990) is the equilibrium dynamics of 
property price, the main task of Fisher et al (2003) is to construct a price index with constant 
market liquidity and thus skip the derivation of equilibrium price dynamics.   
On the empirical side, Fisher et al (2003) finds that there is a positive association between 
constant-liquidity price and trading volume.  However, whether it gives support to the imperfect Alternatively, if the informational friction is the driving force of the 
residential property price-trading volume correlation, then there is no 
strong reason explaining that the correlation would be weaker in the 
commercial real estate market. Similarly, there is no reason why the 
correlation in the rental market should be expected different from that in 
the sale market. Consequently, these sharply different predictions of the 
resulting correlations motivate the understanding of the commercial 
property market in perspective of the market imperfection. 
Methodologically, this paper illustrates the approach to differentiate 
competing theories on one type of property (residential in this case) by 
studying a different type of property (commercial in this case). 
We consider it appropriate to begin the analysis with disaggregate 
date. First, it takes into account of the quality difference and other kinds 
of idiosyncrasy of different office buildings. Second, the composition of 
property being traded may change over the business cycle (such as high 
quality versus lower quality, at the central business district versus rural). 
The results will then be difficult to interpret. Therefore, it would be better 
to start with data of building level. For comparison, these buildings will 
then be aggregated at the district level. We will examine whether the 
                                                                                                                                                               
capital market models or the informational friction models is not clear. It is because in a board 
sense, both down-payment effect and the imperfect information effect will increase the market 
liquidity when the market receives a shock. Thus, while controlling for the liquidity will help us to 
answer some important research question, it might not be particularly helpful in differentiating the 
sources of property price-trading volume correlation.   
 results will change with the level of geographical aggregation.
4 We will 
also conduct some additional tests to examine the robustness of the 
results.  
It should be stressed that the implications of this research reach 
beyond just understanding the dominant force of the property 
price-trading volume correlation. First, for instance, the modeling of the 
real estate market often struggles between the capital market imperfection 
approach and the search theoretic approach, as both approaches are 
consistent with many existing empirical works. This research helps to 
provide some hints for this difficult modeling choice by examining the 
aggregate implications of the two approaches. If the down-payment effect 
and the loss-aversion effect turn out to be the dominant forces behind the 
property price-trading volume relationship, then it might be safe in many 
applied theoretical studies to ignore the imperfect information 
consideration stressed by the search theoretic approach.   
Second, while the two approaches typically imply that the market 
outcome is suboptimal, they carry very different policy implications on 
different issues. For instance, if the imperfect information is the main 
reason for the insufficient liquidity in the real estate market, then the 
government should encourage the investment of information technology 
in the real estate industry and require the real estate agents to provide 
                                                        
4  See Dombrow, Knight and Sirmans (1997), Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor (1996), Smith and 
Campbell (1978) for more discussion on the aggregation bias.   updated information of all the transactions, and perhaps even demand 
both the buyer and seller sides to list their offers and requests. If, however, 
the determining factor of the property market is the capital market 
imperfection, then some intervention in the loan market and insurance 
market may be welfare-improving. Therefore, it is crucially important to 
acquire the knowledge of which dominant force in the property market is.   
Notice that this paper includes the information from both the sale 
market and the rental market. There are several motivations behind this. 
With perfect capital market, Kan, Kwong and Leung (2004) show in a 
dynamic general equilibrium model that the property price and rent will 
be perfectly correlated, due to arbitrage. With imperfect capital market, or 
informational friction, however, the relationship between the price and 
rent is not clear, even less have been discussed related to the 
rental-volume correlation.
5  Thus, it may be interesting to empirically 
investigate the issue. In addition, some features of the commercial 
property market of Hong Kong may not be shared by all other places. In 
Hong Kong, some buildings are for sale only; some are for rental only 
(“cash cows”), while some welcome both kinds of trading, and the rental 
market is more important in the sense that the total office space occupied 
by “renters” is significantly higher than that by “owners”. In addition, a 
transaction in the sale market may also provide information for rental 
                                                        
5  See Genesove (2003) for some discussion on this. market participants in the new contract terms negotiations. And although 
the model by Berkovec and Goodman focuses on the sale residential 
property market, the same logic applies to the rental commercial property 
market. Consider that there are a group of office space owners, waiting to 
rent out their properties. An adverse shock will decrease the demand and 
increase the vacant units. It leads the “landlords” to adjust the posted rent, 
and perhaps the expectation as well, downward. Hence the rent and 
trading in the rental market will be positively correlated. Putting all these 
together, therefore, it seems to be reasonable to analyze the case of rental 
market with the sale market, and allow the readers to compare and 
contrast the results. 
The organization of the paper is as follows.
6 The next section 
provides a description of the data used, followed by a discussion of the 
methodology. The empirical findings and interpretations of these findings 
are presented in the next section, followed by some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Data Description 
 
The commercial property data that is used in this paper was 
provided by the Economic Property Research Centre (EPRC).
7  It  traces 
                                                        
6  Just like many other papers, this work builds on a large literature on real estate and finance. However, 
due to the space limit, we can only refer the interested readers to Feng (2003) for a survey. 
7  In Hong Kong, all real estate transactions need to be registered and the EPRC simply compiles the 
data files from the Hong Kong government. For more details about the EPRC, see Leung, Lau and all sales and purchases records in Hong Kong for each individual office 
estate during 1992-2001, most of them in the second-hand market. The 
data files include the name of the estates, the installation date, the 
transaction price and the construction area. This study selects buildings 
which have complete information of the transactions, and have at least 4 
transactions during the sampling period (full sample). However, the 
correlation between trading volume and transaction prices from buildings 
with only a few transactions might not be very informative.
8 Therefore, 
restricted sample is selected, which include office buildings with at least 
40 transactions during the sample period to ensure that on average there is 
at least one transaction in a period, which is a quarter. The collection of 
buildings which have transactions in both the sale market and in the lease 
market is referred as the overlapping sample.  
Furthermore, the buildings are re-grouped at more aggregate 
geographical regions to examine the results’ robustness on quarterly 
frequency. The first level is the 18 (small) districts, and the second level 
                                                                                                                                                               
Leong (2002), Feng (2003).   
The Hong Kong data has several merits. For instance, it has a simple tax system. Capital gains tax has 
never been imposed and the tax rate on income is essentially flat and maintained at a low level. In 
contrast to some other Asian countries, there is no barrier to capital flow. The exchange rate of the 
domestic currency in terms of the U.S. dollar is fixed throughout the whole sampling period. Therefore, 
the risk for foreign investors is approximately equal to the domestic agents.    
8  In this paper, trading volume is measured by the total number of transactions. We have also used the 
total area of transactions as a measure of trading volume, and the results, which will be available upon 
request, are quantitatively similar.   
Comparing with the finance literature, we have an additional complication, which is the lack of 
transaction. We simply assume that during the period of no transaction, we assume the return/detrended 
price to be unchanged, which can be interpreted as a Markov-type process. If we had high frequency 
data and much more transactions, as in the case of financial research, we can take advantage of 
recursive regression to calculated expected rate of return during no transaction period. This however is 
not feasible for many real estate researches, including the current one. See Feng (2003) and later 
sections for more discussion.     is the 3 (large) regions,
9  and the last level is the whole Hong Kong. Table 
1 presents some summary statistics of the sample.   
(Table 1 about here) 
In Table 1, we can see that although the number of qualified 
buildings in the rental market is less than the purchase market, the rental 
market is still non-negligible relative to the sale market. Notice that in 
Hong Kong, some commercial properties are exclusively for rental, to 
generate cash for the corresponding developers (“cash cows”). Therefore, 
the size of overlap sample is limited.   
Table 2 & 3 summarize the number of transactions in the sale and 
rental market.
10  There are more than 18,000 transactions (i.e. sales) in the 
sale market and more than 6,000 transactions (i.e. contract signing) in the 
rental market. It is clear that the most active markets are Yau Tsim Mong, 
Central & Western, and Wan Chai. 
(Table 2, 3 about here) 
Table 4 shows the total number of transactions in each building 
(total trading), the effective sampling period (number of effective 
observations), and the number of zero-transaction period of each building, 
in both the sale market and rental market. Basically, all different rows of 
                                                        
9  The 18 districts classification is according to the Hong Kong government: Central & Western, Wan 
Chai, Eastern, Southern, Yau Tsim Mong, Sham Shui Po, Kowloon City, Wong Tai Xin, Kwun Tong, 
Tsuen Wan, Tuen Mun, Yuen Long, Northern, Tai Po, Sai Kong, Shatin, Kwai Tsing, and Islands. The 
3 regions are: the Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula, and New Territory. 
10  In case of the rental market, we consider each contract renewal a transaction, whether it is with the 
original firm or a new firm. More on this later. the table deliver the same message that the total number of trading 
volume varies significantly across office buildings. The first row is 
self-explanatory. The effective sampling period measures the number of 
periods in between the first and the last period with transaction record. It 
is clear then some buildings have transactions recorded for only very few 
periods during our sample. However, this measure does not capture the 
fact there might be zero transaction periods within the effective sampling 
period. The last row fills this gap. It confirms the statement that the 
number of trading volume varies dramatically across buildings. Figure 1 
provides a visualization of this point.   
(Table 4 about here) 
(Figure 1 about here) 
The property prices are non-stationary over time. Following Leung, 
Lau and Leong (2002), we employ the rate of return, which will also be 
regarded as the detrended property prices, or simply property prices, in 
the rest of this paper. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of each building’s 
quarterly average return
11  in the sale and the rental market. It is clear that 
the average rate of returns in the both markets concentrate at the range of 
-0.1~0.1%. 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
                                                        
11  It is the value weighted average rate of return in real terms, using transaction value as the weight. 
See appendix for more details. 3.  Methodology 
The econometric tools that will be used in this study include 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, partial auto-correlation function 
(PACF), bootstrapping procedure and Granger causality test. Since these 
tools are all discussed in standard econometrics textbooks, we will only 
briefly explain why these tools are used here. As it is standard in the 
literature, ADF test is used to test for the stationarity of the time series we 
will employ. Since we are concerned with the price-trading volume 
correlation, and correlation is only well defined with stationary time 
series, this step is indeed important. After verifying the stationarity, we 
need to “pre-whiten” the series by removing the autocorrelation of the 
series, or a spurious large correlation between different time series can be 
resulted. Thus, we need to use PACF to identify the autocorrelation 
structure to achieve the pre-whitening step. Then we are ready to 
calculate the correlation between property price/rent and the transactions.   
To test for the statistical significance, however, it is necessary to 
know the underlying statistical properties of the time series. Traditional 
approach is to assume that the two time series are jointly normal and 
hence some standard test for significance can be straightforwardly 
employed. However, the normality assumption may not hold. To uncover 
the underlying (unobservable) distribution of the “noises”, this study 
employs the bootstrap procedure. Basically, this procedure involves choosing random samples with replacement from a data set and analyzing 
each sample the same way. Repeating the procedure with a large enough 
times, we can approximate the underlying distribution of noises and then 
test the significance of correlation coefficient.   
The correlation coefficient is a convenient tool to summarize the 
strength of the contemporaneous relationship. However, the relationship 
between two time series need not be contemporaneous. To formally assess 




4.  Empirical Results 
In this section, we will first present the empirical results of the 
building-level analysis. Then we will compare that with the results from 
more aggregated level data. 
 
Sale Market 
Figure 3 displays the distribution of correlation coefficients 
between the price and the trading volume in the sale market for the full 
sample. It is clearly asymmetric and allocates more weight on the left. In 
                                                        
12  For a discussion on the econometric techniques used in this paper, see Greene (2000), Feng (2003). 
We have also re-do all the regressions without pre-whitening and the results are by the large the same. 
(Those results are not reported here but available upon request). For bootstrapping, see also Efron and 
Tibshirani (1993). In this study, we test for the Granger Causality of the rate of return (i.e. detrended 
price) and trading volume without controlling for autocorrelation. The suitable lag length is determined 
endogenously by employing the Schwartz Bayesian criterion for each building. Typically, it is one or 
two periods lag. other words, most office buildings in the purchase market exhibit weak 
correlation between the price and the trading volume, and those who 
exhibit positive correlations are much less than those who exhibit 
negative correlations. 
(Figure 3~6 about here) 
For the restricted sample, as shown in figure 4, the distribution is 
of the similar shape but between the range of -0.5 ~ 0.5. However, the 
main message remains the same. Most buildings exhibit weak 
correlations. To be more precise, significance tests are conducted. It is 
clear from table 5 that for both the full and restricted sample, most office 
buildings (about 90%) do not exhibit significant correlation at the 95% 
confidence level.   
To formally assess the lead-lag relationships between the 
commercial property price and trading volume, Granger causality tests 
are conducted. Table 6 clearly shows that in both the full and restricted 
sample, most buildings (over 80%) do not exhibit any causal relationship 
between the property price and the trading volume. Among the buildings 
with significant causalities, trading volume positively granger causing 
price is the dominant relationship.
13 
Clearly, it is in sharp contrast to the existing literature, which 
identifies a robustly and significantly positive relationship between the 
                                                        
13  We also check that the case of two-way causality never occurs in any of the building-level analysis. property price and the trading volume in the residential property market. 
A potential explanation is that the office buildings are from different 
“classes” and they have very different behaviours. For instance, the office 
buildings may differ in terms of quality (captured by the average price) or 
differ in terms of liquidity, and the price-volume correlations are different 
across different classes of buildings. To investigate this possibility, we 
first plot the price-volume correlation coefficients against the average 
price, and then plot the price-volume correlations against the total trading 
volume of the corresponding building.   
Figure 5 shows two sub-samples of office buildings, one with gross 
net price and the other with net unit price. Yet, there is no clear 
relationship between the price-volume correlation and the price within 
either group. If the real price is a good measure of the building quality, 
then it is safe to conclude that the correlation is not affected by the 
building quality either. 
Figure 6 does not seem to suggest any relationship between the 
price-volume correlation and the trading volume (liquidity). Figure 6 does 
suggest other things, however. Buildings with higher trading volume tend 
to have less variation in the price-volume correlations.   
Rental Market 
 
 The distribution of the correlation coefficients in the rental market 
is almost the same as that in the sale market, as shown in Feng (2003). To formally assess the statistical relevancy, significant tests are run. 
Interestingly, table 7 shows that relative to the sale market, now more 
buildings display negatively significant rent-transaction correlations in 
both the full and restricted sample. The Granger causality test results in 
the rental market and the sale market are similar. About 80% of the office 
buildings do not display any causality between the rental return (or 
percentage rental change) and the number of transactions.   
(Table 7 about here) 
  There is a technical problem specific for the rental market. In the 
sale market, if the buyer stays in the original building, there will be no 
transaction. However, since the rental contracts are typically one to two 
years in Hong Kong, the original tenant may still need to renew with the 
“landlord”. Should this be classified as a transaction? To address this 
problem, we need to first split all the transactions into two groups: one 
group includes all those transactions such that the original renters stay in 
the original property unit, and the other group collects transactions with 
changes. It may be that the renter rents another unit in the same building, 
or simply moves out from the building. Then we count the percentage of 
no-change contract renewal (or, “routine contract renewal”) in the 
building within the sampling period and categorize buildings accordingly. 
If the result is driven by the routine contract renewal, then the proportion 
of significant correlation should decrease with the proportion of routine contract renewal. Table 8 shows that it is not the case. Insignificant 
correlation is the norm and the proportion of insignificant correlation 
does not have any systematic relationship with the proportion of the 
routine contract renewal.   
(Table 8, 9 about here) 
Table 9 shows that in terms of the significance and Granger 
causality tests, the rental market shows little causality relationship as in 
the sale market. There is a difference between the two markets, however. 
Among the buildings with significant causal relationship, the majority in 
the sale market exhibits that the trading volume leads the corresponding 
property price positively (which is more consistent with the search 
theoretic model), while in the rental market, the rental return leads the 
trading volume negatively. It coincides with the conjecture that in the 
rental market, the importance of the capital market imperfection effect is 
less important than the sale market of commercial property. Thus, if the 
informational friction is not important, we should observe that the 
behaviour in the rental market is less consistent with the search theoretic 
models than the sale market. And this is in fact the case here.   
For a comparison, Feng (2003) also plots the rent-transaction 
correlations against the average rent (gross unit rent and net unit rent 
respectively) and total number of transactions. The results are strikingly similar. The rent-transaction correlations are not systematically related to 
the rent or the number of transactions.   
Overlapping Sample 
The previous sections demonstrate that the property price-trading 
volume correlations are generally weak. There is no clear causal 
relationship among the two variables. It is in sharp contrast with the 
previous literature. One potential explanation is this: there is a potentially 
selection bias in the commercial real estate. Perhaps the office buildings 
that are selected by the developers exclusively for sale are intrinsically 
different from those exclusively for rental. Thus, it would be interesting 
to examine the overlapping sample, which collects all the buildings 
traded both in the sale and the rental markets. Notice that there is a 
potentially non-trivial informational spillover between the sale and the 
rental markets. A firm which is negotiating with the landlord can draw 
information not only from the recent lease contracts, but also the recent 
sale deals of that building. It would potentially enhance the bargaining 
process and speed up the information revelation. 
(Figure 7-10 about here) 
 To study this possibility, this paper computes the correlation 
between the detrended property price (or the rate of return in the sale 
market) and the detrended rent in both markets. Similar comparison can 
also be made in terms of trading volume. The results are surprising. As shown in figure 7, the correlations between the returns in the two markets 
are weak. Furthermore, the correlations between the two volumes are not 
systematically related to the trading volumes in the sale market, as shown 
in figure 8. Similarly, the correlations between the price and the rent are 
not systematically related to the price, as shown in figure 9.  Figure 10 
even shows that the correlations between the price and rent are not 
systematically related to the correlations between the trading volumes of 
the two markets. The lack of apparent connection between the sale market 
and the rental market is clearly a challenge to the future research.
14 
Aggregate Market 
Here we study the property price-trading volume correlations in 
more aggregated levels. There are reasons for that. First, it can serve as a 
robust test. Second, the trading volumes of some buildings are small, 
sometimes even zero for some periods. Aggregating across buildings 
within the same period would minimize the number of zero-transaction 
periods. The informational content of the price/rent data in each period 
would therefore increase in the sense that it is now an average of a larger 
number of transactions. Thus, bearing the risk of having aggregation bias, 
we study property price-trading volume correlations at the district and 
region levels. 
                                                        
14  In addition, Feng (2003) finds that the correlations between the trading volumes in sale and rental 
markets are weak, and that correlations are not systematically related to the transaction in the rental 
market. Similarly, the correlations between the price and rent are not systematically related to the level 
of rent.   However, this attempt is soon confronted by a technical issue. 
There are two different definitions of price and rent in Hong Kong 
commercial properties. Buildings in some districts only report the gross 
unit price (or rent) and some only the net price (or rent). In some districts, 
some buildings report gross and some report net. It does not create any 
problem when the investigation is conducted at the building level. 
However, when the aggregation is at district or region level, there is a 
potential danger of being inconsistent. We separate the 18 districts into 4 
groups: districts without any trading in commercial buildings, districts 
using only gross price, districts using only net price, and districts using 
both. Table 10 and 11 report the correlation coefficients computed.   
The result is clear. The main message preserves, namely that there 
is little correlation between trading volume and the corresponding price 
(or rent). The case for regional level data is similar (not reported here). 
The causality, if any, is not always in line with the search theoretic 
models, that volume should granger cause property price or rent 
(positively). The aggregate data supports the conclusions drawn from 
disaggregate data. 
(Table 10 ~13 about here) 
Some Limitations of the Data Set 
  There are obvious limitations of the data set which constrain us to 
push the line even further. For instance, units within the same commercial building are not identical. Units on higher floors are priced higher. 
Another shortcoming of our data set is the absence of the vacancy data. 
Since landlord could respond to external shock through adjusting the 
vacancy rate, the lack of vacancy data could lead to a potentially 
important omission. Future research should take these into consideration.     
  A more fundamental problem is the construction of the rental 
market data. Not all leases in Hong Kong are registered with the Land 
Registry, where the data set employed by this paper is based on. Thus, the 
trading volume might not be very reliable.
15 Rental data might not be 
very reliable as well because for some lease contracts, tax and 
management fee are included and some are not. Sometimes owner can 
offer a rent-free period (could be up to 6 months).
16  These variations are 
not totally random but may depend on the market situation and thus there 
may be a systematic bias in the reported rental data. This paper, however, 
can at most acknowledge these problems, take the official data set as 
given, and pursue the problem as careful as we can.   
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
The primary purpose of this study is to verify and estimate the 
                                                        
15  As one referee observes, there are more transactions in the sale market than the rental market in the 
current sample, while the common knowledge is that the rental market is more active than the sale 
counterpart. This limitation, however, is inherited directed from the official record and we can only 
acknowledge it and proceed nevertheless.   
16  It is not likely to be the case here, because most rental contracts are of one year duration. Rent-free 
for 6 months is equivalent to a 50% off in rental!   relationship between the property price/rent and trading volume in the 
commercial real estate market. This is particularly interesting in light of 
the fact that positive price-volume correlation has been repeatedly found 
in the residential property markets. The dataset here combines 
information from more than 500 office buildings in Hong Kong during 
the period 1992-2001. The most important finding is that over 90% of 
buildings in the sale market, and about 80% of buildings in the rental 
market, neither display any significant correlation nor lead-lag 
relationship between the price/rent and the trading volume. These 
predictions are at odds with search theoretic models but consistent with 
rational expectation models with perfect capital market, such as Lucas 
(1978). For buildings with significant lead-lag relationship between the 
price/rent and the trading volume, it can be positive or negative, and the 
causality can go either way. This finding also holds in different 
sub-samples and different levels of geographical aggregation.   
These results are in sharp contrast to the previous literature. As 
shown in figure 11, the residential property market displays positively 
significant correlations between the property price and trading volume at 
different levels of aggregation, in approximately the same period of time. 
Leung, Lau and Leong (2002) also identify clear causal relationship after 
appropriate filtering procedures. Obviously, the commercial property 
behaves very differently from the residential property.   (Figure 11 about here) 
In terms of methodology, this paper illustrates the approach to 
differentiate competing theories on one type of property (residential in 
this case) by studying a different type of property (commercial in this 
case). Thus, this study opens up an important question that whether there 
are fundamental structural differences between the commercial property 
market and the residential property market, on top of the difference in the 
degree of capital market imperfection faced by the corresponding 
customers. The mainstream theories for the residential market, namely, 
the imperfect capital markets theory and the search theory, may be less 
relevant for the commercial one.    Since large firms, a significant portion   
of customers of the commercial property face less severe financial 
constraints than the residential property market counterparts (i.e. the 
households), the results here can be interpreted as an indirect evidence for 
the dominant role of the imperfect capital market effect in the property 
market. Once the imperfect capital market factor is diluted, the price/rent- 
volume relationship simply disappears. If the informational friction is in 
fact overwhelmed by the imperfect capital market consideration, it will 
carry very different policy recommendations, as suggested in the 
introduction.  
Alternatively, it can be argued that the search theoretic models 
were primarily developed for the residential real estate market and thus may not apply to the commercial market. In other words, a search 
theoretic model for commercial real estate with implications consistent 
with the insignificant price/rent-trading volume relations is demanded. 
One could also argue that the findings here are due to some local features 
of the Hong Kong commercial real estate market which is not shared by 
other markets or, it is due to the imperfections of the rental data of the 
Hong Kong commercial properties, as we have discussed in the previous 
section. On the other hand, even taking all these comments into 
consideration, it is still not clear why significantly negative correlation 
could ever arise, or why the causality between price/rent and trading 
volume can be both positive and negative. As in the case of “equity 
premium puzzle” and “business cycle puzzle” literature, this study only 
establishes clear statistical patterns but unable to provide a sound 
theoretical explanation.
17 Clearly, more efforts are needed to synthesize 
the dramatic difference in the residential property market and the 
commercial counterpart. 
                                                        
17  See Kocherlakota (1996), Christiano and Fitzgerald (1998). References 
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Table 1  Number of buildings in Each Sample Group 
 
Number of buildings  Sale  Rental  Overlapping 
Full sample (total no. of transactions≥4) 547  242  108 
Restricted sample (total no. of transactions≥40)   124  41  11 
 
 
Table 2    Aggregated Sale Market 
 
Market Transactions 
Central & Western  3953 






Yau Tsim Mong  7502 
Sham Shui Po  242 
Kowloon City  503 
Kwun Tong  754 
Kowloon 
Wong Tai Sin  0 
9001 
Tsuen Wan  662 
Tuen Mun  129 
Yuen Long  72 
Kwai Tsing  160 
Shatin 83 
Tai Po  0 
Northern 0 







                                                                                                                                                                                         Table 3  Aggregated Rental Market 
 
Market Transactions 
Central & Western  1653 






Yau Tsim Mong  2374 
Sham Shui Po  234 
Kowloon City  26 
Kwun Tong  88 
Kowloon 
Wong Tai Sin  0 
2722 
Tsuen Wan  222 
Tuen Mun  5 
Yuen Long  0 
Kwai Tsing  153 
Shatin 256 
Tai Po  14 
Northern 282 








 Table 4-a  Summary of Statistics at the Building Level 
 
Sale Market  Rental Market 
Variable List 
max  min mean max  min mean 
Trading volume in each bldg.  542  4  34.5  343  4  27.1 
Effici. sampling period  39  4  29.3  37  4  19 
Zero transaction period  36  0  26.9  36  9  30.4 
 
Table 4-b  Summary of Statistics at the District Level 
 
Sale Market  Rental Market 
Variable List 
max min* mean max min* mean 
(G) 4944  68  959  1244  14  377 
Trading Volume of Each District   
(N) 2558  4  641  1130  5  253 
(G) 40  32  39  39  23  33 
Efficient Sampling Period 
(N) 40  9  32  38  9  27 
(G) 28  0  6  32  2  14 
Zero Transaction Period 
(N) 36  0  15  36  2  20 
 
Table 4-c  Summary of Statistics at the Region Level 
 
Sale Market  Rental Market 
Variable List 
max min* mean max min* mean 
(G) 5123 1097 4156 2145  873  1509 
Trading Volume of Each Region   
(N) 3650  9  2137 1212  59  674 
(G) 40  40  40  39  38  38 
Efficient Sampling Period 
(N) 40  20  33  38  34  37 
(G) 0  0  0  2  2  2 
Zero Transaction Period 
(N) 32  0  11  24  2  10 
 
*Note: Calculation of the minimum excludes the district with no transaction record. Table 5  Significance Test of the Correlation in the Sale Market 
 
Sample Positive*  Negative*  Insignificant  Total 
Full  6    49  492  547 
  (1.10%)    (8.96%)  (89.94%)  (100%) 
Restricted  3    6  115  124 
 (2.42%)    (4.84%)  (92.74%)  (100%) 
 
Note: 1. * denotes that it is significant at the 95% confidence level. 
          2. Figures in parentheses are the corresponding percentage of the total number. 
 
 
Table 6  Test Granger Causality of Price and Volume in the Sale Market 
 
  Price→Vol Vol →Price  Neither Total 
35 51  461  547  Full sample 
(6.40%) (9.32%)  (84.28%)  (100%) 
3 17  104  124  Restricted Sample 
(2.42%) (13.71%)  (83.87%)  (100%) 











26 9 49 2  86  Full sample 
(30.23%) (10.47%) (56.98%)  (2.33%) (100%) 
2 1  17  0  20  Restricted Sample 
(10%) (5%) (85%)  (0%) (100%) 
 
Note: 1.  →  denotes the former granger causes the latter. 
          2. (+), (-) denotes the positive and negative causality.Table 7  Significance Test of the Correlation in the Rental Market 
 
Sample Positive*  Negative*  Insignificant  Total 
Full    2  33  207  242 
    (0.83%)  (13.63%)  (85.54%)  (100%) 
Restricted    1  3  37  41 
    (2.44%)  (7.32%)  (90.24%)  (100%) 
 
Note: 1. * denotes that it is significant at the 95% confidence level. 
          2. Figures in parentheses are the corresponding percentage of the total number. 
 
 
Table 8  Significance Test of the Correlation in the Rental Market   
(Split sample by percentage of no-change contract renewal) 
 
Sample Positive* Negative*  Insignificant Total 
0  1 (0.76%)  20 (15.27%)  110 (83.97%)  131 
1-25% 1  (1.52%)  5(7.58%)  60 (90.91%)  66 
26-50% 0  6  (17.65%)  28 (82.35%)  34 
51-75% 0    2  (22.22%)  7(77.78%)  9 
76-100% 0  0  2 (100%)  2 
Total  2 (0.83%)  33 (13.63%)  207 (85.54%)  242 
 
Note: 1. * denotes that it is significant at the 95% confidence level. 
          2. Figures in parentheses are the corresponding percentage of the total number. 
 
 
Table 9    Test for Granger Causality of Rent and Volume in the Rental Market 
 
  Rent→Vol Vol →Rent  Neither Total 
28 14  200  242  Full sample 
(11.57%) (5.79%) (82.64%)  (100%) 
6 3  32  41  Restricted Sample 
(14.63%) (7.32%) (78.05%)  (100%) 











9 19 9  5  42  Full sample 
(21.43%)  (45.24%)  (21.43%) (11.90%)  (100%) 
1 5 2 1  9  Restricted Sample 
(11.11%)  (55.56%)  (22.22%) (11.11%)  (100%) 
 
Note: 1.  →  denotes the former granger causes the latter. 
          2. (+), (-) denotes the positive and negative causality. Table 10 Correlation Significance in the District Level Sale Market 
 
  +ve and sign  -ve and sign  insign  Inconsistence*  total 
ZERO transaction  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5 
Districts (G)  1(33%)  0  2 (67%)  0 3  (100%) 
Districts (N)  0  0  0  0  0 
Districts (G & N)  3 (30%)  0  10 (100%)  3 (30%)  10 (100%) 
 
Table 11 Correlation Significance in the District Level Rental Market 
 
  +ve and sign  -ve and sign  insign  inconsistence  total 
ZERO transaction  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5 
Districts (G)  0  0  5 (100%)  0 5  (100%) 
Districts (N)  1 (100%)  0 0  0  1  (100%) 
Districts (G & N)  1 (14%)  0  7 (100%)  1 (14%)  7 
 
Note: inconsistence means the district displays the +ve sign (significant at 95% confidence interval) 
with G (Gross price) and insign with N (Net price). So the total number in the last column is computed 
as (+ve) + (-ve) – inconsis = total. 
 










(-)  Neither Total 
District (G)  0  0  1 (33%)  0  2 (67%)  3 
District  (N)  0 0 0 0 0 0 
District (G&N)  1 (10%)  0  4 (40%)  1 (10%)  4 (40%)  10 
 
  










(-)  Neither Total 
District (G)  0  0  0  0  5 (100%)  5 
District (N)  0  0  0  0  1 (100%)  1 
District (G&N)  2 (29%)  0  1 (14%)  0  4 (57%)  7 
 
 
Note: 1. G denotes the sub-sample of transactions recorded in gross unit price; 
            2. N denotes the sub-sample of transactions recorded in net unit price; 
      3 .  →  denotes the former granger causes the latter. 
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Figure 8 Effect of Total Volume of Sales on the Correlation 
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Figure 9 Price Effect on the Correlation between Returns
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Figure 10 Relationship Beween Two Correlations







































Figure 11   Price Indices and No. of Sales Transactions 







1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year
price indices (all classes) No. of Transactions (thousands)
 
 
Source: The Land Registry of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Property Review (2002); 
              Cheng Wing Yan (2002) table 2. 
Note: figures in 2001 are provisional. 
     No.  of  transactions  do  not  include  primary sales of Government-subsided housing units. 
 
 
 Appendix: Measurement 
 
This appendix provides the details of all the measurement. 
Rate of Return (ROR) as a measure of current price level 
Here in this study, we use the realized rate of return to measure the current price level. Firstly, it is 
distinguished from the expected return which is often discussed in the asset market. Second, it is the 
percentage change of the real price thus eliminating the possible non-stationarity and the scale effect. 
Third, it is a value weighted average figure in quarterly frequency because, intuitively, the larger the 
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where i is the index of building, j is the number of transactions of the i
th building per quarter, P is the 
price per square foot, Q is the unit area (gross or net), W is the ratio of the dollar value on the 
transaction date to the total dollar value transacted within a quarter,  P is the weighted average price 
per quarter. 
After deflating  P  by the quarterly composite consumer price index (1990=1), we derive the 





















* is the real price per quarter of a certain building, ROR t is the rate of return per quarter of 
that building. 
 
For convenience, the real price in the zero-transaction quarter is set to equal to the real weighted 
average price in the previous quarter. This treatment is intuitive since the ROR is perceived to be zero 
when there is no transaction during the period.   
A complication comes from the zero-transaction period which appearing in the beginning or at the 
end of the sample periods. Should we still set ROR=0? Obviously, it is no meaning to include so many 
zeros in the head and tail of a series. Most importantly, it will be misleading because the market price 
is unobservable, rather than unchanged, for those missing records periods. So we just calculated the 




Number of transactions as a measure of trading volume 
 
In this study, trading volume is treated simply as the number of transactions within each quarter. 
This measure is the one most in line with the theoretic literature.
18 Therefore, unlike kinds of volume 
measures proposed and studied in the stock market
19, the most widely employed measure in the 
property is the number of transactions to avoid the possible disturbing effect of the heterogeneous 




                                                        
18  In the context of residential property, Lau (2000) shows that the results of using total number of 
units traded, total area traded and the total value traded are very similar. 
19  See Wang (2000) for a summary of the various measures used in a representative sample of the 
recent volume literature. Appendix: figures for the rental markets (from Feng (2003)) 
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)Appendix: alternative measure of trading volume 
Instead of measuring the trading volume by the number of transactions, we reproduce the results 
when trading volume is measured by the total area being traded.   
 

















































































Table 1  Significance Test of the Correlation Coefficients 
(Sale Market) 
 
Sample Positive*  Negative*  Insignificant  Total 
6     154  387  547 
Full 
(1.10%)    (28.15%)  (70.75%)  (100%) 
4     51  69  124 
Restricted 
(3.22%)    ( 4 1 . 1 3 % )   (55.65%)  (100%) 
 




















































































  Table 2  Significance Test of the Correlation Coefficients 
(Rental Market) 
 
Sample  Positive*       Negative*  Insignificant  Total 
10 80 152  242 
Full 
(4.13%) (33.06%)  (62.81%)  (100%) 
5 18  18  41 
Restricted 
(12.20%) (43.90%) (43.90%)  (100%)  
Note: 1. * denotes that it is significant at the 95% confidence level. 




Table 3    Test for Granger Causality between Price and Trading Volume   
(Sale Market) 
 
Sample  Price→Vol Vol →Price  Neither Total 
58 52  437  547 
Full 
(10.60%) (9.51%) (79.89%)  (100%) 
8 13  103  124 
Restricted 
(6.45%) (10.48%)  (83.06%)  (100%) 













28  30 36 16  0 110 
Full 
(25.45%)  (27.27%) (32.73%) (14.55%)   (100%) 
2  6 9 4  0 21 
Restricted  
(9.52%) (28.57%) (42.86%) (19.05%)   (100%) 
 
Note: 1.  →  denotes the former granger causes the latter. 
2. (+), (-) denotes the positive and negative causality. 
 
 
Table 4      Test for Granger Causality between Rent and Trading Volume 
(Rental Market) 
 
Sample  Rent→Vol Vol →Rent  Neither Total 
39 25 178  242 
Full 
(16.12%) (10.33%) (73.55%)  (100%) 
6 5 30  41 
Restricted 
(14.63%) (12.20%) (73.17%)  (100%) 













18 21 17  8 0 64 
Full 
(28.13%) (32.81%) (26.56%) (12.50%)   (100%) 
1 5 3 2  0 11  Restricted 
(9.09%) (45.45%)  (27.27%)  (18.18%)   (100%) 
 
Note: 1.  →  denotes the former granger causes the latter. 
          2. (+), (-) denotes the positive and negative causality  
 